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UNFRIENDING TINKER: THE THIRD CIRCUIT HOLDS SCHOOLS
CANNOT REGULATE OFF-CAMPUS SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH
AMANDA N. HARDING*
I. NOW TRENDING: THE INCREASE IN SOCIAL MEDIA USE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
After coming across sexually explicit messages between sixteen-year-
old Channing Smith and another male student, a peer shared the images
to their public Instagram and Snapchat stories.1  Hours later, Smith com-
mitted suicide.2  Smith’s story is unfortunately not an isolated event and
illustrates the tragic consequences of cyberbullying and online hate
speech.3  Although the two interacted in the same classroom, the incident
occurred outside the classroom through the use of social media.4  This
raises a question that public schools across the country are facing—could
school officials have done anything about the posts, or must they help-
lessly stand by as students like Smith fall victim to cyberbullying?
It goes without saying that social media is a popular way for teens to
communicate.5  In 2019, roughly two-thirds of teens had at least one active
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2019, University of Delaware.  This Note is dedicated to Mark Harding, Anna
Harding, Jessica Harding, and Trevor Firgau.  Thank you for your endless love and
support.  I would also like to thank the members of the Villanova Law Review for
their hard work and feedback throughout the writing process.
1. Kat Tenbarge, A 16-Year-Old Died by Suicide After a Classmate Posted Explicit
Messages Between Him and Another Boy on Social Media. Now, His Family Is Seeking Jus-
tice, INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2019, 11:09 PM), https://www.insider.com/tennessee-chan-
ning-smith-suicide-social-media-bullying-coffee-county-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/
6CPX-JY3R] (explaining peer obtained private Facebook messages between Smith
and another male).
2. Id. (noting Smith’s family believes these social media posts were “the driv-
ing force behind his suicide”).  Before taking his life, Smith shared on Instagram
that he was taking a break from social media and wrote, “I really hate how I can’t
trust anyone because those I did were so fake.  Bye . . . .” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
3. See Monica Anderson, A Majority of Teens Have Experienced Some Form of
Cyberbullying, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/in-
ternet/2018/09/27/a-majority-of-teens-have-experienced-some-form-of-cyberbully-
ing/ [https://perma.cc/3XKK-LM4T] (revealing survey results that show fifty-nine
percent of teens have been cyberbullied).
4. See Tenbarge, supra note 1 (explaining Smith likely saw posts while home).
5. See Monica Anderson & JingJing Jiang, Teens, Social Media & Technology
2018, PEW RES. CTR. (May 31, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2018/05/31/teens-social-media-technology-2018/ [https://perma.cc/KF6T-
N5DB] (acknowledging ninety-five percent of teens have or have access to a
smartphone).  For purposes of this study, teens were considered ages thirteen to
seventeen. See id.  When teens were asked what social media platform they use the
most, eighty-five percent said YouTube, seventy-two percent said Instagram, sixty-
(219)
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social media profile, and eighty-nine percent reported being online “al-
most constantly” or “several times a day.”6  More alarming, however, is that
over half reported that they have experienced some form of bullying or
harassment while online.7
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted these concerns, as it increased
the world’s reliance on the internet.8  Once students began learning re-
motely and interacting with peers exclusively online, instances of cyberbul-
lying and social media hate speech increased.9  An April 2020 report
published by L1ght revealed that social media hate speech among stu-
dents increased seventy percent since ceasing in-person learning.10  Over-
all, ninety percent of teens view this misuse of social media as a problem
among their age group, and over fifty percent believe that teachers fail to
adequately address the situation.11  Students may have various theories as
to why their teachers do not intervene in online bullying or harassment.12
But in reality, confusion as to who has authority to intervene may cause
the teachers’ hesitancy to interject.13
nine percent said Snapchat, fifty-one percent said Facebook, and thirty-two per-
cent said Twitter. Id.
6. Id. (noting about nine out of ten teens go online multiple times per day);




%20capabilities [https://perma.cc/VB7P-DUCC] (last updated Mar. 2018) (ex-
plaining that, on average, teens are online for nine hours per day).
7. See Anderson, supra note 3 (emphasizing teens who spend more time on-
line are more likely to experience online harassment).  Offensive name-calling and
rumor spreading were the most commonly reported forms of online harassment.
See id.
8. See Lauren Barack, Navigating Cyberbullying More Difficult Amid COVID-19, but
There Are Options, K-12 DIVE (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.educationdive.com/
news/navigating-cyberbullying-more-difficult-amid-covid-19-but-there-are-option/
582771/ [https://perma.cc/5A2M-7GQN] (recognizing students’ potential in-
creased vulnerability to cyberbullying due to COVID-19 distanced learning
requirements).
9. See id. (stating “one of the first things parents and educators may want to do
when a student is cyberbullied is get them offline,” but noting the impracticality of
taking a student offline “when every one of a student’s friends is probably online,
along with many of their classes”).
10. See id. (suggesting social distancing decreased physical bullying but in-
creased cyberbullying).  L1ght is a startup that “helps detect and filter abusive and
toxic online content.” Id.
11. See Anderson, supra note 3 (“[M]ajorities of young people think key
groups, such as teachers, social media companies and politicians are failing at tack-
ling [the online harassment] issue.”).  Fifty-eight percent of teenagers said that
they had a negative view of how teachers handled incidents of cyberbullying or
online harassment. Id.
12. See id.
13. See Lisa Smith-Butler, Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: Balancing Bullies’ Free
Speech Rights Against the Rights of Victims to Be Let Alone When Regulating Off-Campus K-
12 Cyber-Speech, 37 NOVA L. REV. 243, 299–301 (2013) (explaining schools are faced
2
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The U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment guarantees citizens the
freedom of speech.14  This right extends to online speech as well as
speech that is offensive, vulgar, or controversial.15  When students share
questionable content on social media, schools struggle to balance this fun-
damental right with the need to maintain a safe academic environment.16
For example, an Ohio high school suspended several students in 2018 af-
ter criticizing the school’s superintendent on Twitter.17  Alternatively,
with “more questions than answers” when it comes to ability to regulate off campus
speech that impacts on-campus activities).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
15. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (“A funda-
mental First Amendment principle is that all persons have access to places where
they can speak and listen . . . .  [O]ne of the most important places to exchange
views is cyberspace, particularly social media . . . .); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 563
U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (explaining government cannot restrict speech merely be-
cause it is offensive).
16. See Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at 299 (noting a principal is “damned if
they do and damned if they don’t” when it comes to handling incidents of off
campus cyberbullying that impact the on-campus environment (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Effects of Bullying on Mental Health, STOPBULLYING.GOV (Oct.
25, 2019), https://www.stopbullying.gov/blog/2019/10/25/effects-bullying-
mental-health [https://perma.cc/6GB4-Q64X] (“Research suggests that children
and youth who are bullied over time are more likely . . . to experience depression,
anxiety, and low self-esteem.  They also are more likely to be lonely and want to
avoid school.”).  Social media is relatively free from parental control and monitor-
ing, which can result in posting students sharing questionable content. See Cathe-
rine E. Mendola, Big Brother as Parent: Using Surveillance to Patrol Students’ Internet
Speech, 35 B.C. L.J. & SOC. JUST. 153, 155 (2015) (“Absent oversight, students are
left to their own devices, able to make independent, potentially dangerous moves
in their otherwise micromanaged worlds.”).  While cyberbullying is one example of
how a student may exercise poor judgment online, there are other ways students
use social media in a negative manner. See id. at 156.
Unaware or simply indifferent to the repercussions of public postings on
the Internet, students have unveiled violent plans against themselves and
others, including bomb threats and school shootings.  They have dis-
cussed eating disorders, underage drinking, sexual encounters, and drug
use.  Students have also criticized teachers and school administration.
Regardless of a student’s motive—a cry for help, boredom, or peer pres-
sure—a student’s out-of-school Internet speech often has an impact on
his educational environment, his peers, and his community.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
17. See Emily Mills, Madison Students Get Detention After Criticizing Superintendent
on Twitter, MANSFIELD NEWS J., https://www.mansfieldnewsjournal.com/story/
news/local/2018/09/14/madison-students-punished-after-criticizing-superinten-
dent-twitter/1294713002/ [https://perma.cc/79GL-PELU] (last updated Sept. 14,
2018, 6:43 PM) (reporting that eight to ten students were punished for posting
negative tweets about their superintendent).  One student tweeted a message to
the school’s superintendent, writing, “ ‘A leader wouldn’t let (their) kids be edu-
cated in 100-degree heat’ and ‘In my opinion, you should leave the district.’” Id.
The student sent the tweet while in school, and school officials asked the student
to delete the message. Id.  Although the student initially complied, another tweet
was posted later that read “standing my ground,” resulting in the three days of in-
school detention. Id.
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Princeton University recently declined to intervene when a student used a
racial insult on Facebook.18
This inconsistent enforcement is prevalent not only in school districts
but also in courts.19  In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,20 the Supreme Court clearly delineated students’ First Amend-
ment rights in school.21  But the Court decided Tinker before the inven-
tion of modern social media and has not yet extended its precedent to
online speech.22  This year, in B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area School Dis-
trict,23 the Third Circuit declined to extend the Tinker substantial disrup-
tion test (Tinker exception) to off-campus cyberspeech and concluded
students retain full First Amendment rights outside of school.24  This
marked the broadest circuit court opinion about off-campus student
cyberspeech thus far.25  This broad-sweeping rationale differs from the
Fourth Circuit’s sufficient nexus test, which is consistent with Tinker and
properly addresses off-campus electronic speech cases.26
18. See Imani Mulrain et al., Princeton, It’s 2020: Stop Protecting Racial Slurs,
DAILY PRINCETONIAN (Aug. 6, 2020, 6:46 PM), https://www.dailyprincetonian.com
/article/2020/08/princeton-free-speech-anti-racism-stop-protecting-racial-slurs
[https://perma.cc/VJ4A-FTZH] (stating Vice President for Campus Life Rochelle
Calhoun emailed students to express that the student’s use of a racial slur did not
violate University policy).  Vice President Calhoun sent the message was in re-
sponse to a petition drafted by students, which asked Princeton to hold a discrimi-
nation hearing. Id.
19. Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 577 (4th Cir. 2011)
(finding school could constitutionally suspend student who used MySpace page to
bully peer while off campus), with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that school could not constitution-
ally punish student for parody MySpace page of school principal while off
campus).
20. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  For a discussion of Tinker and Supreme Court prece-
dent on student speech, see Section II.A.
21. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (“In the absence of a specific showing of consti-
tutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom
of expression of their views.”).
22. See id. at 506 (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate.”); see also William Calve, Comment, The Amplified Need for Supreme Court
Guidance on Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 377, 392 (2016)
(explaining Supreme Court has not said whether Tinker exception applies to off-
campus student speech).
23. 964 F.3d 170 (2020).
24. See id. at 191.  While the holding in Tinker consists of multiple parts, for
the purposes of this Note, the phrase “Tinker exception” will hereinafter be used to
refer to Tinker’s substantial disruption test.  For a discussion of Tinker and its sub-
stantial disruption test, see infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
25. See B.L. ex rel. Levy, 964 F.3d at 196 (Ambro, J., concurring) (noting the
Third Circuit is first circuit court to find that students retain full First Amendment
rights while off campus).
26. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572–73 (4th Cir. 2011)
(applying Tinker’s sufficient nexus test).  For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s
approach, see infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
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This Note analyzes the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the Tinker ex-
ception does not apply to off campus cyberspeech.  Part II summarizes the
relevant Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases, emphasizing the dif-
ferent approaches to off campus electronic speech.  Part III discusses the
facts and procedural history of B.L.  Part IV describes the Third Circuit’s
holding in B.L. that students retain full First Amendment rights while us-
ing social media off campus.  Part V provides a critical analysis of the
Third Circuit’s holding and advocates that the Fourth Circuit’s sufficient
nexus test offers a more appropriate solution for precedential and policy
reasons.  Part VI illustrates the impact of B.L. and the need for Supreme
Court guidance.
II. A SCREENSHOT OF STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Between 1969 and 2007, the Supreme Court decided four student
speech cases.27  Many circuit courts have relied on these cases for gui-
dance when addressing off-campus student speech.28  However, their in-
consistent approaches have confused school officials and demonstrated a
need for further Supreme Court intervention.29
A. Before Social Media Went Viral: Supreme Court Decisions on Student Speech
Over fifty years ago in Tinker, the Supreme Court stated that public
school students do not lose their First Amendment rights while on school
27. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (finding “special charac-
teristic of the school environment” enables schools to regulate student speech pro-
moting illegal drug use (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (noting school officials may regulate expres-
sion associated with academic curriculum “to assure that participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not
exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that
the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school”);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (determining appro-
priate for school district to regulate vulgar student expression).
28. See Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba County
School Board: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify Students’ First Amendment Rights in the
Digital Age, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1554 (2017) (discussing how lower courts have
had to apply Supreme Court’s “twentieth century” student speech cases to “twenty-
first century” student speech issues).
29. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 353 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The law
governing restrictions on student speech can be difficult and confusing, even for
lawyers, law professors, and judges.  The relevant Supreme Court cases can be hard
to reconcile . . . .”); Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally
Halt Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy That Considers First Amendment, Due
Process, and Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 657 (2011)
(noting the circuit court split indicates the law is unclear); Mendola, supra note 16,
at 161 (noting “[t]he resulting circuit split is based primarily on varying interpreta-
tions of the Court’s 1969 holding in Tinker, as applied to Internet conduct decades
later”).
5
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property.30  The Court found the school’s punishment of three students
for wearing headbands to be an unconstitutional restriction on speech.31
The Court emphasized that “students . . . [do not] shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”32
Although Tinker clarified that students retain significant First Amend-
ment rights while in school, these rights are not as extensive as those of a
regular citizen.33  The Court inserted a narrow exception that allowed
school officials to regulate student speech that would “materially and sub-
stantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.”34  Speech that is merely controversial or unpop-
ular does not meet this standard.35  Rather, the speech must threaten to
disrupt the operation of the school or violate the rights of other
students.36
A material and substantial disruption is not the only limit on students’
First Amendment rights while in school.  In three cases following Tinker,
the Supreme Court carved out additional exceptions.37  These cases reaf-
firm that there are boundaries to students’ First Amendment rights in
school.38
30. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and
students.”).
31. Id. at 505–06 (stating that wearing armbands constitutes “pure speech,”
which is entitled to First Amendment protection (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (first citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); then citing Adderly v. Flor-
ida, 384 U.S. 39 (1966))).
32. Id. at 506 (clarifying that this has been the Court’s stance for nearly fifty
years).
33. See id. at 513.  The Tinker court decided that a student’s speech loses con-
stitutional protection if it compromises the school environment:
But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially dis-
rupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.
Id.
34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363
F.2d 744, 749 (1966)) (explaining schools may regulate speech that disrupts
school activities or rights of others).
35. See id. at 509 (“In order for the [s]tate in the person of school officials to
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
36. See id. at 514 (stating that school authorities must demonstrate that stu-
dent speech “forecast[s] substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities” in order to justify regulation).
37. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 683 (1986).
38. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (“The First Amendment does not require
schools to tolerate at school events student expression that contributes to . . . dan-
6
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The first exception emerged in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.39
In that case, Matthew Fraser used a sexual metaphor in a speech at a
school assembly.40  In response, the school suspended Fraser for two
days.41  The Court found the suspension did not violate the First Amend-
ment because Fraser’s speech contained vulgar and offensive language.42
The Court noted part of a school’s role is to exemplify and enforce appro-
priate forms of expression.43  Unlike the political speech in Tinker, the
sexual metaphor in Bethel affronted “the ‘fundamental values’ of public
school education.”44
The following year, the Court added another caveat to the Tinker ex-
ception in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.45  In that case, the Court
found a principal did not violate students’ First Amendment rights by re-
moving student articles discussing divorce and abortion from a school-
sponsored newspaper.46  The Court reasoned that the school, as the pub-
lisher of the paper, may set high standards for student speech and refuse
publication if those standards are not met.47  The Court stated schools
must consider the maturity of the speech’s audience when trying to pro-
tect its students from inappropriate speech.48  Thus, the Court held that it
gers [such as illegal drug use].”); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 274 (deciding principal
may constitutionally censor articles in school newspaper); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683
(finding school may regulate vulgar, nonpolitical student speech).
39. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
40. Id. at 677–78 (emphasizing Fraser’s speech, which was in front of approxi-
mately 600 students).  Fraser’s stated purpose for his speech was to nominate a
peer for student elective office. Id. at 677.
41. Id. at 679.
42. See id. at 683 (concluding that speech offensive to mature adults and dam-
aging to younger, impressionable students is unprotected).
43. See id. (“Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school educa-
tion to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”).  The
Court emphasized that education “is not confined to books, the curriculum, and
the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social
order.” Id.
44. Id. at 685–86 (deeming appropriate and constitutional a school’s mea-
sures to regulate vulgar speech and lewd conduct). The Fraser court noted the
tensions between promoting viewpoint diversity at schools and protecting the sen-
sibilities of fellow students. See id. at 681 (“The undoubted freedom to advocate
unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced
against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior.”).
45. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
46. Id. at 270–71 (distinguishing from Tinker because it concerns whether
schools must promote student speech rather than whether schools may silence
student speech).
47. See id. at 271–72 (explaining school newspapers can set higher standards
than actual newspaper publishers).  A school may refuse to associate itself with
speech that is “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id. at 271.
48. See id. at 272 (noting emotional maturity “might range from the existence
of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual
activity in a high school setting”).
7
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is constitutionally permissible for schools to exercise this sort of control so
long as it is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”49  In
other words, censorship of a school-sponsored form of expression is ac-
ceptable if justified by a legitimate educational purpose.50
In 2007, Morse v. Frederick51 added the final exception to Tinker.52
While at an off-campus, school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick waved a
banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”53  When Frederick refused to
take the banner down, the school principal issued him a ten-day suspen-
sion.54  Ultimately, the Court upheld the suspension because the banner
could reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal drug use rather than
articulating a political message.55  The Court considered the speech “in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment” and rea-
soned that the banner’s message contradicts the school’s interest in deter-
ring drug use.56  Moreover, the Court considered this a school speech case
because Frederick was at a school-sponsored event and directed the ban-
ner at students.57
B. A Blurry Picture: The Differing Circuit Court Approaches to Off-Campus
Social Media Speech
Although the Supreme Court has yet to comment on a school’s ability
to regulate off-campus student cyberspeech, many circuit courts have.58
To date, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
49. Id. at 273 (explaining that a school’s exercise of control over student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities does not violate First
Amendment).
50. See id.
51. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
52. See id. at 408 (finding “special characteristics of the school environment”
enable school to regulate expression promoting illegal drug use (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))).
53. Id. at 397.  The event took place across the street from Frederick’s school,
those inside the school could view the banner. Id.
54. Id. at 398 (noting Frederick’s principal believed the banner encouraged
illegal drug use).  Frederick’s principal believed this banner violated the school’s
policy, which states in part, “[t]he Board specifically prohibits any assembly or pub-
lic expression that . . . advocates the use of substances that are illegal to mi-
nors . . . .” Id. (second and third alteration in original) (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 402–03 (stating the banner could not be interpreted as a political
message).  If the students created the banner to advocate for legalization of mari-
juana or to promote a religious belief, in all likelihood, the Court would have
protected Frederick’s speech because Tinker protects political messages. See id.
56. Id. at 405 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506) (explaining a banner promot-
ing drug use creates concrete danger in school environment).
57. See id. at 393–94 (rejecting the student’s argument that these facts fall
outside the purview of “school speech” cases).
58. See e.g., Katherine A. Ferry, Comment, Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme
Court’s Interpretation of “Social Media” as Applied to Off-Campus Student Speech, 49 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 717, 732–42 (2018) (summarizing courts’ varying approaches to off-
campus student cyberspeech).
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Circuits have addressed the issue of off-campus student cyberspeech to va-
rying outcomes.59  Of these approaches, the Fourth Circuit’s sufficient
nexus test most effectively balances First Amendment rights and the
school’s need to maintain a safe environment.60
The Second Circuit typically has followed the reasonable foreseeabil-
ity test, which examines whether it is reasonably foreseeable to school offi-
cials that the off-campus speech will reach school grounds.61  If the answer
is yes, the court applies the Tinker exception and asks whether the speech
is likely to cause a substantial disruption.62  If it is, school officials may
discipline the student without running afoul of the First Amendment.63
Alternatively, before B.L., rather than assessing whether the Tinker ex-
ception extends to instances of off-campus student speech, the Third Cir-
59. See id. at 730 (explaining that although most circuits have applied a form
of the Tinker exception, they interpret and apply Tinker and its progeny in different
ways); see also Daniel Marcus-Toll, Note, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging Threshold Tests
for Student Regulation of Off Campus Digital Student Speech, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3395,
3420 (2014) (“There is a split among the federal courts of appeals with respect to
whether, and under what circumstances, [the Tinker exception] extends to off-
campus student speech.”).  In B.L. ex rel. Levy, the Third Circuit discussed the Sec-
ond, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit approaches. See B.L. ex rel. Levy v.
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 180, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2020).  For additional
context, the Ninth Circuit applies the Tinker exception to cases of off-campus
cyberspeech where there is “an identifiable threat of school violence.”  Ferry, supra
note 58, at 731 (outlining the circumstances which warrant invoking the excep-
tion).  Furthermore, when faced with an instance of off-campus student cyber-
speech, the Eleventh Circuit asks whether school officials were justified in
expelling a student based on a combination of the Tinker exception and the true
threat approach. See Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 982 (11th Cir.
2007).
60. See Kristopher L. Jiles, Note, Trigger Fingers Turn to Twitter Fingers: The
Evolution of the Tinker Standard and Its Impact on Cyberbullying Amongst Adolescents, 61
HOW. L.J. 641, 663 (2018) (arguing the nexus test adequately balances interests
because before regulating, a school must prove a nexus between speech and
school).  For a discussion of why the Fourth Circuit’s sufficient nexus test best
balances these interests, see infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
61. See Ferry, supra note 58, at 732 (describing the test as an “additional
threshold” to the Tinker exception).
62. See id. (noting that Second Circuit rejected the true threat approach be-
cause “school administrators’ authority is beyond what the true threat standard
allows”).
63. See id. (“[I]f off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substan-
tial disruption within a school, the school has the authority to discipline the stu-
dent.”).  In 2007, the court applied this test in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of
Weedsport Central School District, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).  While at home, a stu-
dent sent out a drawing of their English teacher being shot via instant message.
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d  at 35–36.  As a punishment, the school suspended the stu-
dent. Id. at 34–35.  When addressing whether the suspension was constitutional,
the court applied a combination of the reasonable foreseeability test and the
Tinker exception. See id. at 40.  It ultimately found that because the speech could
reach school grounds and cause a substantial disruption. Id.  Thus, the suspension
was constitutional. Id.
9
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cuit assumed that it applied.64  In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School
District,65 an eighth grade student created a MySpace profile to poke fun at
their school principal.66  Consequently, the school suspended J.S.67  To
assess the constitutionality of this suspension, the Third Circuit focused on
the student’s intent.68  To uphold the suspension, the school had to pro-
vide express evidence that the student intended for the speech to make its
way onto school grounds and that readers would take its content seri-
ously.69  Because the student made the page private, the Third Circuit
found it unlikely that the speech would cause a substantial disruption.70
Thus, the student’s suspension was unconstitutional.71
The Fourth Circuit has followed the sufficient nexus test.72  This test
asks whether the off-campus conduct is sufficiently connected to the
school’s pedagogical interests to warrant punishment.73  A school can reg-
ulate off-campus student speech if doing so protects the well-being of stu-
dents and promotes education.74  Applying the sufficient nexus test in
64. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir.
2011) (assuming without explanation that the Tinker exception applies).  In
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, the Third Circuit took this same
approach. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219
(2011) (“[W]e need not now define the precise parameters of when the arm of
authority can reach beyond the schoolhouse gate . . . .”).
65. 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).
66. Id. at 920 (explaining profile contained “adult language and sexually ex-
plicit content”).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 948 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“The majority goes so far as to state
that we should take J.S.’s speech less seriously because she intended it as a
‘joke.’”).
69. See id. at 930–31 (explaining that to justify suspension, J.S. must have in-
tended for the student body to be the target audience).
70. See id.  J.S. granted access to about twenty-two students at the school, and
because the school district blocked MySpace, students could not view the page
while on campus. See id. at 920–21.  According to the record, the page was “so
outrageous that no one took its content seriously.” Id. at 921.
71. See id. at 931.  Although the majority avoided addressing whether school
officials can regulate off-campus student speech, Judge D. Brooks Smith—joined
by four others—tackled the issue in a concurring opinion. See id. at 936 (Smith, J.,
concurring).  Judge Smith argued that “[a]pplying Tinker to off-campus speech
would create a precedent with ominous implications. Doing so would empower
schools to regulate students’ expressive activity no matter where it takes place . . . .”
Id. at 939.
72. See Ferry, supra note 58, at 755 (noting that Fourth Circuit is only circuit
to adopt sufficient nexus test).  This Note asserts that the Fourth Circuit’s suffi-
cient nexus test appropriately addresses the concerns surrounding off-campus stu-
dent cyberspeech.  For an in-depth discussion of the advantages of the Fourth
Circuit’s test, see infra Section V.C.
73. See Calve, supra note 22, at 386 (describing sufficient nexus test as “thresh-
old prong,” meaning a sufficient connection between the speech and the school
must be establish before applying Tinker exception).
74. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011)
(“[S]chool administrators must be able to prevent and punish harassment and bul-
lying in order to provide a safe school environment conducive to learning.”).
10
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Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,75 the Fourth Circuit held that a school
could punish a student who created a MySpace page to post hateful com-
ments about a peer.76  Although the incident occurred off campus, the
Fourth Circuit said it was reasonably foreseeable to the student that their
speech could create a substantial disruption in school because most of the
people who interacted with the page were students.77  Furthermore, the
Fourth Circuit recognized that bullying and harassment are serious issues,
and schools must be able to take action to maintain a safe environment.78
The court noted that “the Constitution is not written to hinder school
administrators’ good faith efforts to address [bullying and harassment].”79
Unlike other circuits, the Fifth Circuit has declined to articulate a
specific test for off-campus cyberspeech.80  Rather, the Fifth Circuit has
applied the Tinker exception on a case-by-case basis.81  In Bell v. Itawamba
County School Board,82 a student created a rap video that accused two sports
team coaches of sexual misconduct.83  The Fifth Circuit applied the Tinker
exception and held that the school may punish the student because the
student intentionally directed the speech at the school.84
75. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
76. Id. at 567 (concluding that the bullying occurred in such a way that “was
sufficiently connected to the school environment as to implicate the School Dis-
trict’s recognized authority to discipline speech”).  Over twenty students were
members of the page, where a peer named Shay was the main subject of discus-
sion. Id. at 567–68.  One student posted a photograph of themselves and a friend
holding a sign that read “Shay Has Herpes.” Id. at 568.  Later, the same student
posted another photograph with a photo of Shay’s face with a sign that read, “por-
trait of a whore.” Id.
77. Id. at 572–73.  The court reasoned that although the hate speech
originated on the bully’s home computer, the bully “knew that the electronic re-
sponse would be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home and could reasona-
bly be expected to reach the school or impact the school environment.” Id. at 573.
Indeed, the victim noted they felt uncomfortable sitting in class with students who
ridiculed them online. Id. at 568.
78. See id. at 572 (equating a school’s duty to maintain an environment free
from bullying to a school’s duty to maintain an environment free from messages
promoting illegal drug, which the Supreme Court articulated in Morse).  The court
briefly noted discussed some of the negative impacts of bullying, which “can cause
victims to become depressed and anxious, to be afraid to go to school, and to have
thoughts of suicide.” Id. (citing STOPBULLYING.GOV, www.stopbullying.gov [https:/
/perma.cc/5HT6-ZJNU] (last visited Feb. 6, 2021)).
79. Id. at 577 (balancing student’s First Amendment rights against school’s
need to maintain an appropriate academic environment).
80. See Ferry, supra note 58, at 737 (noting Fifth Circuit “failed to adopt or
reject approaches advocated by other circuits”).
81. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir. 2015)
(holding Tinker exception applies to speech at issue).
82. 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
83. Id. at 384 (explaining student’s rap video contained vulgar and threaten-
ing language, including “betta watch your back,” and “going to get a pistol down
your mouth”).
84. See id. at 394 (following the four other circuit courts that chose to apply
the Tinker exception in instances of off-campus student cyberspeech).  The Fifth
11
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Finally, the Eighth Circuit follows both the true threat approach and
the Tinker exception in instances of off-campus student speech.85  In
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60,86 the Eighth
Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability approach
and found the Tinker exception applies in cases of off-campus student
speech when it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the
school and cause a substantial disruption therein.87  After D.J.M. used
their home computer to send a classmate messages discussing a potential
school shooting, the school issued a ten-day suspension.88  The court first
held the messages constituted a true threat because the school had
enough information to reasonably conclude that D.J.M. was planning a
school shooting.89  Second, applying the Tinker exception, the court con-
cluded that the school could intervene because the school community
would otherwise be exposed to a serious risk of harm and a disrupted
environment.90
III. SNAPCHAT STORY TO SUSPENSION: THE FACTS OF B.L.
As a freshman at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), B.L. tried out
for the school’s cheerleading team and made the junior varsity roster.91
The following year, as a sophomore, B.L. was again placed on the junior
varsity team.92  Frustrated about not making the varsity team for the sec-
ond year in a row, B.L. posted a picture (snap) on Snapchat of B.L. and a
Circuit pointed out that Tinker was decided in a time when cellphones and social
media did not exist. See id. at 392.  Although the court chose to apply the Tinker
exception to these facts, it noted the need for clear guidance regarding the extent
to which schools may regulate off-campus student speech, given the significant
technological changes since the Tucker exception was established. See id. at 403.
85. See D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754,
763, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying true threat approach and Tinker exception); see
also Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621–22 (8th Cir. 2002)
(applying true threat approach).
86. 647 F.3d 754 (2011).
87. Id. at 766.  The Eighth Circuit followed Second Circuit’s reasonable fore-
seeability approach from Wisniewski v. Weedsport Central School District. Id. at 765–66.
88. Id. at 758.  The student that D.J.M. messaged saved the conversations and
notified the school. See id. at 759.
89. Id. at 762 (finding D.J.M. had intent to communicate their threats).  The
Eighth Circuit defined a true threat as a “statement that a reasonable recipient
would have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or cause injury
to another.” Id. at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v. Pulaski
Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir. 2002)).  Additionally, the
speaker must intend  to communicate the statement to the “object of the pur-
ported threat or to a third party.” Id. (quoting Doe, 306 F.3d at 624).  True threats
are not protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 764.
90. See id. at 766 (holding First Amendment claim properly dismissed due to
the reasonably foreseeable threat).
91. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir.
2020).
92. Id. (noting B.L.’s frustrations to advance in cheerleading while incoming
freshman made varsity).
12
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friend holding up their middle fingers with the caption “[f]uck school
fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.”93  Roughly 250 people could
view the snap, many of whom attended MAHS or were on the cheerlead-
ing team.94  Several students, both cheerleaders and non-cheerleaders,
screenshotted the snap and brought it to the attention of B.L.’s cheerlead-
ing coaches.95
Prior to joining the team, B.L. signed both team and school rules that
required her to avoid “foul language,” “inappropriate gestures,” and shar-
ing “negative information regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, and
coaches . . . on the internet.”96  The cheerleading coaches determined
B.L.’s snap violated these rules and subsequently removed B.L. from the
team as punishment.97  B.L. unsuccessfully appealed the decision to
school authorities.98
In response, B.L. sued the Mahanoy Area School District (School Dis-
trict), claiming the punishment violated their First Amendment right to
freedom of speech.99  The district court agreed with B.L. and granted
summary judgment in B.L.’s favor.100  The court determined that the
school could not punish B.L. because the snap took place off campus and
presented no actual or foreseeable disruption to the school environment,
thus, failing to meet the Tinker exception.101  The district court also noted
that B.L. did not waive the right to free speech by signing the school and
team policies.102
93. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In addition to cheerleading,
other school activities made B.L. unhappy, such as exam anxiety and B.L.’s role on
the school softball team. Id.  B.L. used Snapchat to vent these frustrations. Id.
94. Id. (explaining these 250 people were B.L.’s “friends” on Snapchat).
95. Id. at 175–76 (noting disgruntled students approached coaches to express
concerns about B.L.’s snap being inappropriate).
96. Id. at 176 (alteration in original) (outlining school and team policies).
The school also had a rule that required student athletes to “conduct[ ] themselves
in such a way that the image of the Mahanoy School District would not be tar-
nished in any manner.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. (stating B.L. appealed suspension to the athletic director, school prin-
cipal, district superintendent, and school board).  Although they upheld the
coaches’ suspension, they said B.L. would be eligible to try out for the team the
following year. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.; B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 445 (M.D. Pa.
2019) (finding First Amendment violation because B.L.’s speech neither “bore the
imprimatur of the school or squad” nor caused a substantial disruption), aff’d, 964
F.3d 17 (3d Cir. 2020).
101. B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 443–44.
102. Id. at 437–38 (noting it unnecessary to consider B.L.’s overbreadth, view-
point discrimination, or vagueness claims because all relief sought by B.L. could be
granted solely on First Amendment claim).  The court awarded B.L. nominal dam-
ages and ordered the School District to expunge the suspension from B.L.’s disci-
plinary record. See Matt Miller, Pa. School Violated Cheerleader’s Rights by Punishing
Her For Profanity-Laced Snapchat Post, U.S. Court Says, PENN LIVE (June 30, 2020),
13
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IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT HAS ENTERED THE CHAT: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
ON THE COURT’S REFUSAL TO APPLY TINKER TO OFF-CAMPUS
STUDENT CYBERSPEECH
In B.L. ex rel. Levy, the Third Circuit’s majority affirmed the district
court’s decision that the First Amendment protected B.L.’s speech.103  In
doing so, it rejected approaches taken by other circuits and found that the
Tinker exception does not apply to any instances of off-campus student
speech.104  Although Judge Ambro agreed with the overarching outcome
of the case, he issued a separate concurring opinion to express his con-
cerns with the majority’s broad rejection of the Tinker exception.105
A. Uploading New Content: The Majority in B.L. Takes a Different Approach
to Off-Campus Student Cyberspeech
The School District appealed the district court’s decision to the Third
Circuit.106  The court first had to determine whether B.L.’s snap was pro-
tected speech.107  If the speech was protected, then the court would have
to address whether B.L. validly waived that protection by agreeing to the
MAHS policies.108
The court began by reviewing the Supreme Court’s four main student
speech cases: Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse.109  Overall, it interpreted
these four cases to demonstrate that students have limited First Amend-
ment rights on school grounds, but their rights “are coextensive with
[those] of an adult” when off of school grounds.110  In the Third Circuit’s
view, this implied that school officials cannot constitutionally discipline




103. B.L., 964 F.3d at 194 (reasoning that to allow schools to regulate this
kind of speech gives schools “the power to quash student expression deemed
crude or offensive”).
104. See id. at 187–89 (rejecting Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit’s
approaches in favor of new approach).  For an overview of these approaches, see
supra notes 61–63, 72–90, and accompanying text.
105. See id. at 194, 197 (Ambro, J., concurring) (agreeing with grant of sum-
mary judgment but disagreeing with finding that Tinker exception never applies to
off-campus student speech).
106. Id. at 176.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 176–77 (noting that inquiry does not end if B.L.’s speech is found
to be protected).
109. See id. at 177–78.  For a more in-depth discussion of these four Supreme
Court cases, see supra Section II.A.
110. Id. at 178 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir.
2011)).
111. See id. at 177–78 (emphasizing Morse’s holding was related to speech
“during school hours” and “at a school-sanctioned activity” (quoting Morse v. Fred-
14
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In light of this observation, the court then looked to where B.L.’s
snap occurred.112  It noted that Supreme Court cases “focus[ ] not on
physical boundaries [of the school] but on the extent to which schools
control or sponsor the forum of the speech.”113  The court acknowledged
that at a certain point, the school’s authority comes to an end and cannot
“reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions” in the same way
that it could control the child’s actions in school.114  While the court rec-
ognized that defining this boundary is a difficult task, it ultimately looked
to J.S. and Layshock for guidance.115  Based on those cases, the Third Cir-
cuit concluded that B.L.’s snap occurred off campus because it was posted
while off school grounds on a weekend.116
Next, the court assessed the School District’s defense that it could
constitutionally suspend B.L. under Fraser.117  The School District argued
that it had the power “to enforce socially acceptable behavior” by regulat-
ing speech that is “vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive.”118  The
Third Circuit rejected this argument because Fraser applied specifically to
vulgar, lewd, or offensive speech on campus.119  Thus, Fraser did not apply
because B.L.’s speech took place off campus.120
erick, 551 U.S. 393, 400–01, 407 (2007))).  The court also mentioned that
Kuhlmeier found a school’s “editorial authority applies ‘only when a student’s
school-sponsored speech could reasonably be viewed as speech of the school it-
self.’” Id. at 178 (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213–14
(3d. Cir. 2001)).
112. See id. (explaining on campus and off campus are terms the court uses
“with caution”).
113. Id. at 179.  The Third Circuit noted it previously stated that “[i]t is ‘well-
established’ that the boundary demarcating schools’ heightened authority to regu-
late student speech ‘is not constructed solely of the bricks and mortar surrounding
the school yard.’” Id. at 178 (quoting Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011)).
114. Id. at 179 (quoting Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216).  The School District ar-
gued that as a member of the cheerleading team, B.L. represented MAHS in a way
that is similar to how “government employees represent their employer.” Id. at 183
(quoting Brief of Appellant at 30, B.L., 964 F.3d 170 (No. 19-1842)).  The Third
Circuit rejected both arguments. See id.
115. See id. at 180 (noting that “significant groundwork has been laid”).  In
both of those cases, the Third Circuit concluded that online student speech is not
considered to be on-campus speech even when the communication is shared be-
tween students, refers to the school and school faculty, and impacts the school
environment. See id.  For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see supra notes
64–71 and accompanying text.
116. See id. at 180–81 (concluding that because B.L.’s snap made only a “few
points of contact” with MAHS).
117. See id. at 181.  For an overview of Fraser, see supra notes 39–44 and accom-
panying text.
118. Id. (quoting Brief of Appellant at 7–8, B.L., 964 F.3d 170 (No. 19-1842)).
119. Id. at 181.  The court also noted that in Morse, the Court explained that if
the speech in Fraser occurred “outside the school context, it would have been pro-
tected.” Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)).
120. See id. at 183.  The Third Circuit also reasoned that the School District’s
argument contradicts precedent. See id.  In Layshock, the court declined to apply
15
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Next, the court addressed the School District’s claim that application
of the Tinker exception justified B.L.’s punishment.121  The court consid-
ered three main approaches applied by other circuits: the Second and
Eighth Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability test, the Fourth Circuit’s suffi-
cient nexus test, and the Fifth Circuit’s approach.122  After providing a
brief overview of these three approaches, the court outlined criticisms of
each.123  First, the court emphasized that “bad facts make bad law.”124  It
argued that while it makes sense to allow schools to regulate direct threats
of violence or posts that target students, it creates a slippery slope that
allows for the regulation of other less threatening kinds of online
speech.125  Second, the court felt that these approaches placed too much
speech under the authority of the school because of social media’s perva-
Fraser to off-campus speech, reasoning that doing so would otherwise allow schools
to control expression that was not within their authority to begin with. See id. at
183 (citing Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d
Cir. 2011)).
121. See id. (addressing School District’s argument that “B.L.’s snap was likely
to substantially disrupt the cheerleading program”).  Whether the Tinker exception
could apply to off-campus speech was an issue of first impression and one the
Third Circuit had avoided answering in the past. Id.  In J.S., the court “assume[d],
without deciding” that Tinker exception applied to the off-campus speech because
the school did not demonstrate that a substantial disruption was foreseeable. Id. at
183–84 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d. Cir. 2011)).  Additionally, the court
recognized that when it decided Layshock and J.S., social media just began gaining
popularity, and the Tinker exception’s application to electronic speech was a devel-
oping issue. See id. at 185.  But in 2020, the court realized that this issue could no
longer be ignored due to “social media[’s] . . . expansion into every corner of
modern life.” Id.
122. See id. at 185–86.  For a more in-depth discussion of the reasonable fore-
seeability test, the sufficient nexus test, and the Fifth Circuit approach, see Section
II.A.
123. See id. at 187–89 (rejecting to follow the various approaches taken by its
sister circuits).  Nevertheless, the Third Circuit stated that it sympathized with the
other circuit courts, recognizing the difficulty in navigating students’ off-campus
free speech rights in the context of social media. See id.
124. Id. at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 2013)).
125. See id. (noting that “one unmistakable trend from the case law is that the
most challenging fact patterns have produced rules untethered from the contexts
in which they arose”).  To illustrate this point, the court discussed how in Wisniew-
ski, the Second Circuit used the reasonable foreseeability test to understandably
allow a school to discipline a student who threatened violence. Id.  However, the
Second Circuit later applied the same test to uphold a school’s punishment of a
student who falsely claimed in a blog post that a school band contest was canceled.
Id.
16
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siveness.126  Third, the court did not think that any of these approaches
provided sufficient clarity or predictability.127
Overall, the Third Circuit believed that the three tests offer too broad
of an approach and alter the meaning of Tinker.128  It decided to instead
“forge [its] own path.”129  Thus, the Third Circuit broadly concluded the
Tinker exception does not extend to student cyberspeech that occurs
outside of school-sponsored activities.130  Ultimately, it affirmed the dis-
trict court’s finding that B.L.’s suspension was unconstitutional.131
B. Snapping Back to the Majority: Judge Ambro’s Concurrence
Judge Ambro agreed with the overall judgment of the case but dis-
sented from the majority’s finding that the Tinker exception does not ex-
tend to off-campus cyberspeech, noting the facts currently at issue do not
support such a broad-sweeping conclusion.132  First, Judge Ambro empha-
sized that the Third Circuit previously declined to limit the Tinker excep-
tion to on-campus speech.133  Judge Ambro also noted that no other
126. See id. at 187–88 (explaining that its sister circuits’ tests are overly broad).
Specifically, the court found the reasonable foreseeability test too broad because
many students follow one another, and it is inevitable that a student’s “message
may automatically pop up on the face of classmates’ phones in the form of notifica-
tions from Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, or any number of other social
platforms.” Id. at 187.  Additionally, the court said that the sufficient nexus test
was overly broad because it blurs the line between on and off campus. See id. at
188.  The test allows for schools to regulate speech anytime it disrupts the schools’
educational mission, which the court fears is a power that can be abused. See id.
127. Id. (explaining no approach gives students or teachers “clear guidance”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Longoria Next Friend of M.L. v. San
Benito Indep. Consol. Sch. Dist., 942 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 2019)).  The court
reasoned that the Fifth Circuit approach provides no definitive test. See id.  As for
the reasonable foreseeability test, the court stated it is difficult to predict how or
when off-campus speech will reach on campus. See id.  Regarding the sufficient
nexus test,  the court stated that it is unclear to students what types of speech
would sufficiently relate to a school’s “pedagogical interests.” Id. (quoting Kowal-
ski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F. 3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011)).
128. See id. at 188–89 (explaining that approaches “sweep in too much speech
and distort Tinker’s narrow exception into a vast font of regulatory authority”).
129. Id. at 189.
130. See id. (noting that this approach abides by Tinker and provides school
officials and students with clarity).  The court did acknowledge that the approach
“leaves some vulgar, crude, or offensive speech beyond the power of schools to
regulate.” Id. at 191.
131. Id. at 194.  Although the Third Circuit concluded the Tinker exception
did not apply, if it did, B.L.’s speech likely would have been protected, as it was not
reasonably foreseeable the speech would create a substantial disruption in the
school. See id. at 195 (Ambro, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 194.
133. Id. (explaining that in Layshock, the Third Circuit declined to “define the
precise parameters of when the arm of authority can reach beyond the school-
house gate because . . . [the student’s] conduct did not disrupt the school”) (alter-
ations in original) (quoting Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 205, 220 (3d Cir. 2011))).  Additionally, Judge Ambro noted that, in J.S., the
Third Circuit assumed Tinker applied. Id.
17
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circuit court has rendered such a broad conclusion.134  While other courts
have declined to apply Tinker to off-campus speech based on certain facts,
Judge Ambro stated those same courts later chose to apply Tinker outside
of the geographical school boundary.135
Additionally, Judge Ambro argued that the majority based its s hold-
ing on simple facts.136  While Judge Ambro considered the court’s deci-
sion logical based on these facts, he worried about how the decision could
lead to confusion when applied to more complicated facts.137  For exam-
ple, Judge Ambro noted that it is unclear whether “a school [can] disci-
pline a student who posts off-campus [s]naps reenacting and mocking the
victims of police violence where those [s]naps are not related to school . . .
yet provoke significant disruptions within the school.”138
Finally, Judge Ambro concluded by admonishing the majority’s hold-
ing that courts must exercise judicial restraint when deciding cases.139  Ac-
cording to Judge Ambro, the Third Circuit’s decision was broader than
necessary and “anticipate[d] a question of constitutional law in ad-
vance.”140  Judge Ambro emphasized that the majority could have applied
the Tinker exception to B.L.’s situation and ruled in B.L.’s favor.141  Thus,
it was unnecessary for the majority to go further and analyze whether the
Tinker exception applies to off-campus student cyberspeech.142
134. Id. at 196 (“Instead, ours is the first Circuit Court to hold that Tinker
categorically does not apply to off-campus speech.”).
135. Id. at 196–97 (first citing Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379,
396 (5th Cir. 2015); then citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–53 (2d Cir.
2008); and then citing Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist.,
494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007)).  Judge Ambro noted that “Circuit Courts fac-
ing harder and closer calls have stayed their hand and declined to rule categori-
cally that [the Tinker exception] does not apply to off-campus speech.” Id. at 197.
136. Id. at 195, 197 (describing the case as “straightforward” and one that “is
not close to the line of student speech that schools may regulate”).  B.L.’s speech
was nonviolent and did not mention any specific individuals. See id. at 195.  Al-
though it resulted in a few complaints, the cheerleading coaches testified that
“they did not expect the Snap would substantially disrupt any activities in the fu-
ture.” Id.
137. Id. at 197.
138. Id. (“We promulgate a new constitutional rule based on facts that do not
require us to entertain hard questions such as these.”).
139. Id. (“Do not decide today what can be decided tomorrow, for tomorrow
it may not need to be decided.”).
140. Id. at 194 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,
552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)).
141. Id. at 197.
142. Id. (“We promulgate a new constitutional rule based on facts that do not
require us to entertain had questions such as these.” (footnote omitted)).
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V. PUTTING A FILTER ON SPEECH: WHY IT IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY FOR
SCHOOLS TO REGULATE OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT CYBERSPEECH
While the outcome of B.L. is just, rejecting the Tinker exception in off-
campus student speech cases raises concerns moving forward.143  Under a
more extreme, nuanced set of facts, this holding may bar schools from
regulating cyberspeech that materially and substantially disrupts the
school environment and is harmful to students—solely because it hap-
pened off campus.144  In order to conform with the Tinker’s intent and
progeny to maintain a safe school environment, the Fourth Circuit’s suffi-
cient nexus test offers a solution to the issue that conforms with Tinker.145
A. Giving Tinker a Much-Needed Update: Why Supreme Court Precedent
Supports Extending the Tinker Exception to Off-Campus Cyberspeech
To maintain a safe school environment, the Fourth Circuit’s sufficient
nexus test provides the best analytical framework.146  Although the Su-
preme Court has made clear that students retain their First Amendment
rights in school, Tinker and its progeny also place a limit on those
rights.147  In those cases, the Supreme Court recognized that under some
circumstances, it is appropriate for schools to regulate student speech.148
143. See id. at 195 (explaining that the majority provided no guidance regard-
ing how to apply its holding in future cases and that “there are no facts before [the
court] to draw a clear and administrable line for this new rule”).
144. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 59, at 3419 (arguing limiting school authority
over speech that only occurs on campus is illogical given the nature and reach of
technology).
145. See Jiles, supra note 60, at 662–63 (asserting “sufficient nexus test is the
most adequate test to use in balancing the student’s privacy interests guaranteed
Tinker and the interest of the school district in deterring any future disruptions on
campus”).
146. See Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at 301–02 (“A literal reading of Tinker
reflects that schools can regulate or discipline student speech that occurs off-cam-
pus if it has an on-campus impact that either causes a substantial disruption with
the school’s work, is reasonably foreseeable that it will cause a substantial disrup-
tion with the school’s work, or it collides with the rights of others.”).
147. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (finding schools may
regulate student speech promoting illegal drug use given that it conflicts with
schools’ goal of discouraging illegal drug use); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (noting that school officials may regulate expression asso-
ciated with academic curriculum in order to tailor it to the maturity of students);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (determining it appro-
priate for a school district to regulate vulgar student expression); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding a school may
regulate student speech if the speech creates material and substantial disruption).
148. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (explaining First Amendment rights of public
school students are not the same as rights of adults).  Additionally, this demon-
strates that since Tinker, the Supreme Court has been comfortable with adding
additional restrictions to student’s First Amendment rights given the facts of the
situation. See Shaver, supra note 28, at 1582.  Thus, as our society continues to
change, it is possible that the Court would be comfortable adding another excep-
tion to student speech rights. See id.
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In Fraser, for example, Justice Burger noted that “simply because the use of
an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making
what the speaker considers a political point, [it does not follow that] the
same latitude must be permitted for children in public school.”149
Tinker should evolve with the times by extending to off-campus speech
because its exceptions promote a safe and orderly environment in
school.150  If speech impedes on the rights of other students, while simul-
taneously disrupting normal school activity, schools can regulate
speech.151  This comports with the Supreme Court’s recognition that stu-
dents have more limited First Amendment rights while in school.152  But
those cases dealt with issues of school-sponsored speech and did not con-
sider the future impact of electronic communication and the prevalence
of social media.153  As compared to fifty years ago, the rise of electronic
communication has led to less emphasis on where the speech occurs; sepa-
rating off-campus speech from on-campus speech is no longer clear.154
Online communication is constant, readily accessible, permanent, and
quickly circulated.155  The fast-paced, widespread nature of social media
speech enters and impacts the school environment even more easily than
traditional forms of expression.156  Thus, to preserve the intent behind
149. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (comparing First Amendment rights of students to
the First Amendment rights of general adult citizens); see Smith-Butler, supra note
13, at 298 (explaining students’ First Amendment rights are not absolute).
150. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (acknowledging that schools need authority to
“prescribe and control conduct in the schools”); see also Shaver, supra note 28, at
1589–90 (noting Court’s intent that Tinker stay relevant).
151. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (holding “schools may take steps to safeguard
those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as en-
couraging illegal drug use”); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (explaining schools can regu-
late speech that causes a material and substantial disruption and collides with the
rights of others); see also Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at 302 (proposing that focus-
ing on whether the off-campus speech collides with the rights of others can help
schools determine when it is constitutionally permissible to intervene).
152. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (acknowledging that although students have First
Amendment rights, schools need to authority to create and enforce rules in order
to maintain an appropriate environment).
153. See Shaver, supra note 28, at 1589 (noting Tinker “was decided in an age
where students did not harass or bully each other electronically”).
154. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 59, at 3418 (“The increasingly easy transmis-
sion and accessibility of digital speech pose significant problems for the territory-
based approach to school regulation of student speech under Tinker.”); see also
Shaver, supra note 28, at 1541 (describing task of creating a geographic boundary
as “unworkable given the reach of digital speech”).
155. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 59, at 3419 (describing cyberspeech as
“uniquely pervasive and accessible”); see also Goodno, supra note 29, at 660 (ex-
plaining cyberbullying spreads easily being that “[i]nternet links and text messages
can easily be forwarded to numerous people with the click of a button”).
156. See Barry P. McDonald, Regulating Student Cyberspeech, 77 MO. L. REV 727,
746 (2012) (highlighting that “cyberspace knows no geographic boundaries and
cybercommunications are much more pervasive, enduring and easy to engage in
than communications in the ‘physical’ world”).  Even though cyberbullying may
only occur outside of school, school is so integral to students’ lives that the impact
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Tinker and ensure a safe, secure school environment, the Tinker exception
must apply to off-campus student social media speech.157
Despite the difficulty in drawing a distinction between on- and off-
campus speech, there remains a compelling argument that student social
media speech falls within the school’s authority.158  The Supreme Court in
Tinker noted:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any rea-
son—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.159
While schools must respect students’ First Amendment rights, they
also must have the ability to address off-campus cyberbullying that causes a
substantial disruption in the school building or impedes a student’s right
to school safety.160
is often felt there. See Caralee Adams, Cyberbullying: What Teachers and Schools Can
Do, SCHOLASTIC, https://www.scholastic.com/teachers/articles/teaching-content/
cyberbullying-what-teachers-and-schools-can-do/ [https://perma.cc/FC6B-Y67Z]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2020) (explaining that even though cyberbullying often oc-
curs off campus, “the fallout is often seen at school and can interfere with the
educational environment”).  Nancy Willard, Director of the Center for Safe and
Responsible Internet Use, explained that “Monday is the new Friday . . . .  It used
to be that hurtful interactions built up over the week and could blow up on Friday.
Now when kids go back to school on Monday, they are upset because of what
happened over the weekend.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. See Shaver, supra note 28, at 1589–90 (recognizing that although Tinker
was decided before digital age, its intent to protect students from “bullying or
harassing speech” extends to cyberspeech).
158. See McDonald, supra note 156, at 745 (explaining that student cyberbully-
ing typically arises from school relationships).  In all likelihood, physical off-cam-
pus bullying does not fall within the school’s authority. Id.  What distinguishes off
campus cyberbullying from off campus physical bullying is that “cyberspace knows
no geographic boundaries . . . .  [It] has an ‘everywhere’ and ‘all the time’ quality
which bullying that occurs in the physical world generally lacks.” Id. at 746.  Addi-
tionally, because cyberbullying can occur anonymously, a bully is more likely to be
even harsher than they would be face-to-face. See Jiles, supra note 60, at 646.
159. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(emphasis added) (reading the Constitution to allow regulation of “speech-con-
nected activities in carefully restricted circumstances”).  While the “substantial dis-
ruption” test often gets significant attention from courts, the “collides with the
rights of others” portion is key, as it can assist school officials when they are in
situations where the speech is troubling but does not rise to the level of a substan-
tial disruption. See Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at 302.  Speech that is troubling—
yet may not rise to the substantial disruption standard—could be speech that is
“bullying, harassing, libelous, or threatening” or has to do with “cruelty, racism,
sexism.” Id. at 302, 303.
160. See Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at 303 (“Schools want to protect student
political speech rights yet also allow schools the flexibility to cope with cruelty,
racism, sexism, libel, or threats that other types of student speech create.”); see also
Adams, supra note 156 (explaining that cyberbullying is now a “school climate and
safety issue”).
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Furthermore, the geographical origin of the cyberspeech means
means much less today than it did when the Supreme Court decided
Tinker.161  Thus, the  majority in B.L. may have focused too much on loca-
tion rather than the speech’s effects within the school community.162
Now, students can constantly contact one another while off campus.163
The majority of contacts students make are with their peers.164  In all like-
lihood, these students follow one another on social media, based on their
preexisting relationships from school.165  What a student posts, messages,
or shares online can be viewed or commented on by their peers, ex-
tending their interactions beyond the school building.166  For these rea-
sons, online content easily makes its way into the school building through
students who virtually bring it through the school’s doors.167  Forcing
schools to abide by the strict geographic location of where the speech be-
gan seems immaterial when the speech significantly impacts the school’s
most important group: the students.168
B. Tinker is a Must Follow: Public Policy Supports Applying the Exception in
Cases of Off-Campus Social Media Speech
In addition to Supreme Court precedent, public policy supports ex-
tending the Tinker exception to off-campus social media speech.  In B.L.,
the Third Circuit logically found that B.L.’s speech was protected because
the snap did not cause harm to anyone.169  Even if the court applied the
Tinker exception to the case, it is likely that the First Amendment would
have still protected B.L.’s speech because it did not create the requisite
161. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 59, at 3419 (arguing that today, determining
whether speech occurred on or off campus can be an “arbitrary exercise”).
162. See Shaver, supra note 28, at 1541 (asserting that given the pervasiveness
of social media, it is “unworkable” for courts to limit school authority based on
geography).
163. See Anderson & Jiang, supra note 5 (finding forty-five percent of teens are
online almost constantly).
164. See McDonald, supra note 156, at 745 (noting that “cyberbullying arises
out of relationships or events under the supervision and control of school
officials”).
165. See id. (“[W]hen cyberbullying arises out of relationships or events under
the supervision and control of school officials . . . it is occurring because of the
students’ identities qua students rather than in their role as general citizens . . . .”).
166. See Anderson & Jiang, supra note 5 (noting the internet is one significant
way teens communicate and maintain relationships with one another); see also
Mendola, supra note 16, at 158 (explaining students use technology for school-
related communication).
167. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 59, at 3419.
168. See McDonald, supra note 156, at 732 (noting impossibility of cyber-
speech occurring entirely on or off campus).  For instance, the bully may send the
victim a threatening message via social media while on campus, or the victim may
receive the threatening message on campus. See id.  Moreover, the initial bullying
could originate on campus and continue off campus. See id.
169. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 190 (3d Cir.
2020).
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“substantial disruption.”170  The Third Circuit’s majority opinion is con-
cerning not because it chose to protect B.L.’s speech, but rather because
of the precedent it sets for future cases, where the cyberspeech is more
vulgar or violent.171
School officials have a legitimate interest in regulating certain kinds
of off-campus online speech for two reasons.172  First, schools do not
merely teach students subjects like math, history, and science.173  Rather,
schools also take on an inherent responsibility to teach social etiquette.174
To show students how to appropriately engage and communicate with
others, it is important for school officials to be able to regulate inappropri-
ate forms of cyberspeech.175  Doing so sets an example for students by
signifying that the school neither tolerates nor ignores inappropriate or
harmful speech.176
170. Id. at 197 (Ambro, J., concurring) (arguing Tinker “no doubt works here
to rule in B.L.’s favor”).
171. See id. at 193–94 (questioning how the majority’s holding will apply to a
more difficult set of facts, such as an instance of “off-campus racially tinged student
speech”).
172. See McDonald, supra note 156, at 745 (explaining connection between
off-campus cyberbullying and the school and advocated for school speech rules to
address these situations).
[W]hen cyberbullying arises out of relationships or events under the su-
pervision and control of school officials, and in this sense we can say that
it is occurring because of the students’ identities qua students rather than
in their roles as general citizens, it would seem legitimate for the school
to apply appropriate function-sensitive student speech rules to such an
incident . . . .
Id.
173. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“The
process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to
books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the
shared values of a civilized social order.”); see also Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at
302–03 (“The school’s goal is to teach students civil discourse and debate while
protecting their rights to debate contentious issues.”).
174. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (“The undoubted freedom to advocate unpop-
ular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against
the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior.”).  An important aspect of civil discourse involves being re-
spectful of others. See id.
175. See id. at 683 (noting that school officials are role models to students and
“demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by
their conduct and deportment in and out of class”).  Teachers and coaches are
also in positions where they can identify if a child is being bullied or is a bully. See
Effects of Bullying on Mental Health, supra note 16.  If these individuals can promptly
identify and address bullying and mental health concerns, it “can help prevent
harmful negative experiences and keep children and youth moving forward in a
positive trajectory. . . .” Id.
176. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (reasoning that “schools  must teach by exam-
ple the shared values of a civilized social order “); Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at
304 (noting that schools must balance students’ First Amendment rights while also
“providing a safe school environment that neither permits, condones, or ignores
student bullying or harassment.”).
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Second, cyberbullying and hate speech have a severe impact on stu-
dents’ mental health and the school environment.177  Whether the speech
occurred in person, at school, or online over social media should not be
relevant when the ultimate impact is on the student and their educational
experience.178  If schools stand by and say nothing when a student is bul-
lied online, then the bully is less likely to stop, and will continue to subject
the victim to this negative behavior.179  Furthermore, a student might feel
distracted in school, or avoid school completely, after being bullied online
by peers.180  While schools must demonstrate respect for students’ First
Amendment rights, they also must maintain an appropriate and comforta-
ble environment for students.181  The characteristics of the school envi-
ronment permit a school to regulate off-campus social media behavior
that causes harm to others.182
177. See Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at 291 (explaining bullying has serious
physical and psychological health impacts); see also Facts About Bullying, STOPBULLY-
ING.GOV, https://www.stopbullying.gov/resources/facts [https://perma.cc/3SXH-
8SAM] (last updated Aug. 12, 2020) (stating research indicates bullying can lead
to “feelings of isolation, rejection, exclusion, and despair, as well as depression and
anxiety, which can contribute to suicidal behavior”).  The negative impact of
cyberbullying can extend to bystanders and the bullies themselves. See Effects of
Bullying on Mental Health, supra note 16 (noting bystanders may experience in-
creased anxiety and depression while bullies are at higher risk for antisocial
behavior).
178. See Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at 303 (“[T]he schools must also provide
a safe environment in which students can thrive and learn without being subjected
to harassment, bullying, libel, or threats”); see also Sherri Gordon, The Real-Life Ef-
fects of Cyberbullying on Children, VERYWELLFAMILY (July 10, 2020), https://www.very
wellfamily.com/what-are-the-effects-of-cyberbullying-460558 [https://perma.cc/
LW8W-PWLW] (noting victims may “experience some unique consequences and
negative feelings”).  Victims of cyberbullying can “experience anxiety, . . . . depres-
sion, . . . low self-esteem, . . . and struggle academically.” Id.
179. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (noting First Amendment does not prohibit
schools from regulating speech that “would undermine the school’s basic educa-
tional mission.”); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011)
(noting that school officials serve as “the trustees of the student body’s well-
being”).
180. See e.g., Justin W. Patchin, Millions of Students Skip School Each Year Because
of Bullying, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (Jan. 3, 2017), https://cyberbullying.org/mil-
lions-students-skip-school-year-bullying [https://perma.cc/EP9Q-8M2M] (estimat-
ing that 5,400,000 students skip school every year due to bullying).  A survey of
2,750,000 students showed that roughly 300,000 stayed home “many times” as a
result of online bullying. Id.  Moreover, of students who are cyberbullied, only
56.8% reported that they felt safe in school. See id.  Comparatively, of students who
are neither bullied in person nor online, 95.4% reported that they felt safe in
school. See id.
181. See Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at 303 (emphasizing schools’ responsibil-
ity to provide students with a safe learning environment).  Students’ First Amend-
ment rights are important, but the existence of this right does not mean that
schools must ignore off-campus bullying or harassment. See id. at 304.
182. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682–83 (“Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the
states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and sub-
ject to sanctions.”); see also Shaver, supra note 28, at 1547.  While adults have signifi-
cant latitude when expressing their viewpoints, students are not afforded the same
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss1/5
2021] NOTE 243
C. Precedent and Policy Support Subscribing to the Sufficient Nexus Test
Overall, the Fourth Circuit’s sufficient nexus test best conforms with
Supreme Court precedent and public policy.183  This test strikes an appro-
priate balance between students’ First Amendment rights and the neces-
sity of maintaining an appropriate, safe school environment.184  Speech
such as B.L.’s snap would remain protected, while schools would be per-
mitted to regulate more dangerous forms of cyberspeech.185
The sufficient nexus test strikes a balance between First Amendment
concerns and protecting student well-being because it considers the
school’s task to educate, the mental health of students, and whether the
speech will cause a substantial disruption in the school.186  If these factors
demonstrate that the cyberspeech is sufficiently connected to these three
interests for schools, the Tinker exception will apply and allow the school
to intervene if the speech is likely to create a substantial disruption.187
Importantly, the test does not consider where the speech originated,
avoiding the impossible task of determining whether the electronic speech
occurred on or off campus.188
Although the majority in B.L. declined to apply the sufficient nexus
test, its reasons for failing to do so are unpersuasive.189  The majority’s
freedom while in school.  Shaver, supra note 28, at 1546 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at
682).  Rather, schools balance a student’s right to express “unpopular and contro-
versial views” with their interest in teaching students how to appropriately engage
in public discourse. Id.
183. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s sufficient nexus test, see supra
notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
184. See Goodno, supra note 29, at 697 app. B (explaining under the sufficient
nexus test, speech can come into the school’s jurisdiction when “there is a suffi-
cient nexus between the electronic communication and the school which includes,
but is not limited to, speech that is directed at a school-specific audience, or the
speech was brought onto or accessed on the school campus, even if it was not the
student in question who did so”).
185. See B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 197 (3d Cir.
2020) (Ambro, J., concurring) (arguing B.L’s speech would be upheld under
Tinker).  Although B.L.’s snap offended and concerned some students, it did not
rise to the level of a substantial disruption nor did it impede upon the rights of
others. See id. at 195.
186. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 59, at 3425–26 (explaining sufficient nexus
test focuses on “the school’s educational mission and duty to its students”).
187. See McDonald, supra note 156, at 737 (explaining that a sufficient nexus
between the speech and these interests “might include the fact that a speaker
could foresee that her speech could ‘reach the school or impact the school envi-
ronment’”) (quoting Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 62 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir.
2011)).  One relevant factor to determine if there is a sufficient nexus between the
speech and the school’s interests is whether a speaker could foresee the speech
“reach[ing] or impact[ing] the school environment.” See id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Kowalski, 62 F.3d at 573).
188. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (declining to determine whether speech
occurred on or off campus because there was a strong nexus between speech and
school’s interests).
189. For a more detailed summary of the Third Circuit’s concerns with the
sufficient nexus test, see supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
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first reason for rejection was its concerns over a slippery slope, allowing
schools to regulate other less threatening kinds of online speech.190  But
the sufficient nexus test does not give schools an infinite ability to punish
students for any kind of speech.191  Before a school regulates student
speech, the test requires that the school to establish a legitimate connec-
tion between the speech and school’s interest in providing an appropriate
learning environment.192  Also, under the Tinker exception, a school must
demonstrate the likelihood that the speech would create a substantial dis-
ruption in the school.193
The majority in B.L. also rejected the sufficient nexus test because it
felt that the test placed too much speech within the school’s authority.194
It is true that this test gives a school significant authority over speech.195
However, a major part of a school’s role is to maintain a safe learning
environment for students.196  When one student is making another stu-
dent feel uncomfortable or unsafe, school officials are in one of the best
positions to resolve the problem.197
Finally, the majority opinion was concerned that the sufficient nexus
test fails to provide clarity or predictability in future outcomes.198  While
the sufficient nexus test may not provide a bright-line rule, that is the na-
190. B.L., 964 F.3d at 188 (expressing concern that sufficient nexus test pro-
vides school officials with power that can be taken advantage of).
191. See Goodno, supra note 29, at 666 (noting that by incorporating suffi-
cient nexus language into a school policy, schools are likely protected from chal-
lenges that policies are overbroad); see also Jiles, supra note 60, at 664 (explaining
sufficient nexus test is a preliminary test to determine whether the Tinker excep-
tion applies).
192. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (noting that the school’s “pedagogical inter-
ests” must be sufficiently connected to speech to “justify the action taken by school
officials in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being”).
By requiring schools to establish this relationship before moving to the Tinker anal-
ysis, this step adds an additional burden on schools and ensures they do not have
limitless authority. See Jiles, supra note 60, at 666.  It imposes a strict standard that
ensures schools are not able to regulate any speech that is related to the school
and just speech that is “so related to the pedagogical interest of the school, to
warrant regulation.” Id. at 666.
193. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969) (noting regulation of student speech requires school to identify potential
disruptions of activities).
194. B.L., 964 F.3d at 188.
195. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (noting “courts [have]
routinely deferred to schools’ authority to make rules and to discipline students
for violating those rules”).
196. See Smith-Butler, supra note 13, at 302–03 (explaining schools have an
obligation to guard against forms of bullying, threats, and inter-student
discrimination).
197. See Effects of Bullying on Mental Health, supra note 16 (explaining coaches
and teachers can identify and address peer to peer bullying).
198. B.L., 964 F.3d at 188 (stating sufficient nexus test “leav[es] students to
wonder what types of speech might implicate a school’s ‘pedagogical interests’”
(quoting Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011))).
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ture of the issue at hand.199  These cases are fact-dependent, and it is
counterintuitive to have a clear and rigid rule.200  Regardless, it is unlikely
students will not understand what speech is protected versus what speech
is punishable.201  Thus, the sufficient nexus test provides a flexible ap-
proach for complex fact patterns.
Additionally, the majority did not explain how declining to apply the
Tinker exception in any circumstance created more clarity than the suffi-
cient nexus test.202  The opinion tells us that schools can never intervene
but fails to address what should happen under a set of facts which are less
clear-cut than those in B.L.203  A blanket statement that the Tinker excep-
tion does not extend to off-campus cyberspeech creates more confusion
than the sufficient nexus test because it does not allow courts and schools
to act logically and flexibly based on the circumstances.204
199. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015)
(declining to adopt any rigid rule because “such determinations are heavily influ-
enced by the facts in each matter”); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (“[T]he school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a
criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.”).
200. See B.L., 964 F.3d at 197 (Ambro, J., concurring) (explaining that fully
declining to apply the Tinker exception to off-campus speech cases is illogical).
Emphasizing the difficulties and highly factual nature of these cases, Judge Ambro
wrote, “[t]he bottom line is that Circuit Courts facing harder and closer calls have
stayed their hand and declined to rule categorically that Tinker does not apply to
off-campus speech.” Id.
201. See Jiles, supra note 60, at 666 (explaining under sufficient nexus test,
cyberbullying between students almost certainly falls under school’s authority).
For instance, posting online about religious or political beliefs will generally fall
under protected speech given that it does not target other students. See Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (explaining that in
order to regulate student speech, school officials “must be able to show . . . more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accom-
pany an unpopular viewpoint”).  Alternatively, given that cyberbullying directly im-
pacts the victim’s academic experience, that speech will typically fall within the
school’s discretion. See Jiles, supra note 60, at 666–67.
202. See B.L., 964 F.3d at 197 (Ambro, J., concurring) (expressing concern
that categorical rule will create more confusion).
203. See id. at 195 (noting majority provides no guidance regarding how the
decision will apply to future cases where off-campus cyberspeech threatens or ha-
rasses others in school community).  The majority recognized that it is not facing a
case where the off-campus speech directly harassed or threatened students or
teachers. See id. at 190.  Still, it disagreed with courts that have applied the Tinker
exception to instances of threatening or harassing off-campus cyberspeech.  Id.
Despite disagreeing, the Third Circuit offered no insight into how its holding in
B.L. would apply under those circumstances. See id.  Instead, the court wrote that
the “opinion takes no position on schools’ bottom-line power to discipline speech
in that category” and merely acknowledged that its holding diminishes schools’
abilities to regulate some speech. Id. at 190–91.
204. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 575 (illustrating that in order to provide a se-
cure environment, schools need to be able to exercise discretion when it comes to
discipling students).
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VI. TTYL: THE FUTURE OF OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT CYBERSPEECH AND
NEED FOR SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE
With conflicting resolutions among schools and courts alike, it is es-
sential that the Supreme Court address this issue.205  Currently, both
school officials and students are uncertain of how to navigate off-campus
social media speech.206  This lack of clarity opens the door for schools to
inconsistently target, discipline, or silence specific groups.207  For exam-
ple, in an Alabama school district, twelve out of the fourteen students ex-
pelled due to social media posts were students of color, despite the fact
that over sixty percent of the town’s population is white.208  If the Su-
preme Court clarifies the standard for off-campus cyberspeech, this would
assist groups like the expelled Alabama students can raise constitutional
challenges to schools’ application of speech restrictions.
Luckily, there is a chance that the Supreme Court could address this
issue.209  On August 28, 2020, the Mahanoy Area School District filed Peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari.210  Given the increasingly important role that
the internet and social media play in students’ daily lives, there is hope
that the Supreme Court will hear the case.211  However, in 2016, the de-
205. See Calve, supra note 22, at 401–04 (warning that without clear guidance,
schools may draft policies encroaching upon rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion); Goodno, supra note 29, at 657 (“There is no Supreme Court case squarely on
point.  The split in the lower courts’ decisions shows that the law is ambiguous.”
(footnote omitted)).
206. See Calve, supra note 22, at 401 (noting that “[b]ecause ‘lower courts
have not spoken with a unified voice’ on the issue of off-campus speech, schools
and students are both left without clues as to how to proceed within the law” (foot-
note omitted) (quoting Martha McCarthy, Cyberbullying Laws and First Amendment
Rulings: Can They Be Reconciled?, 83 MISS. L.J. 805, 806 (2014))).
207. See Vera Eidelman & Sarah Hinger, Some Schools Need a Lesson on Students’
Free Speech Rights, ACLU (Sept. 18, 2018, 5:15 PM) [https://perma.cc/4D8U-
ENYN] (stating “experience shows that discipline for student expression is not al-
ways applied evenhandedly”).
208. See id. (explaining “one student was expelled for wearing a sweatshirt
depicting her murdered father, and another was expelled for posting a photo of
himself ‘holding too much money’”); Sharada Jambulapati, Story From the Field:
Children of Color Pushed Out of Alabama Schools Over Social Media Posts, S. POVERTY L.
CTR. (July 9, 2015), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2015/07/09/story-field-chil-
dren-color-pushed-out-alabama-schools-over-social-media-posts-0 (adding that Afri-
can-American students represent seventy-eight percent of the school district’s
expulsions).  The school district hired a consulting firm to monitor students’ social
media posts and, in turn, expelled a disproportionate amount of students of color.
Eidelman & Hinger, supra note 207.
209. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel.
Levy, 2020 WL 5234951 (2007) (No. 20-255).
210. Id.
211. See Anderson & Jiang, supra note 5 (acknowledging ninety-five percent of
teens have or have access to a smartphone); see also American Academy of Child
and Adolescent Psychiatry, supra note 6 (noting seventy-five percent of teens have
one or more active social media profiles).  Following the COVID-19 pandemic, the
internet became more important than ever before. See Barack, supra note 8.  For
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fendant in the Fifth Circuit’s Bell opinion petitioned for a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court, which was denied.212
Until the Court addresses the issue of off-campus cyberspeech speech,
schools should tread carefully if punishing students for off-campus cyber-
speech in light of the Third Circuit’s holding in B.L.  Because the Third
Circuit concluded the Tinker exception does not extend to off-campus
electronic speech, it is unlikely that a court in its jurisdiction would up-
hold intervention.213  Even school policies prohibiting certain kinds of on-
line speech are virtually unenforceable if the speech occurs off campus
and is unrelated to a school-sponsored activity.214
Despite the inability to punish students for off-campus cyberspeech,
cyberbullying and online harassment are still pressing concerns for
schools.215  While B.L. greatly limits how schools can retroactively address
social media misuse, schools can at least focus on strengthening prevent-
ative measures.216  For instance, integrating lessons about cyberbullying
and its effects into the academic curriculum can teach students how to
behave appropriately while online.217  More broadly, schools should en-
sure they are fostering an inclusive and tolerant environment so students
will be encouraged to treat one another with respect while on social me-
dia.218  These proactive measures will not erase all incidents of cyberbully-
instance, students now rely on the internet to take class and interact with friends.
Id.
212. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (denying certio-
rari); see also Shaver, supra note 28, at 1588 (describing Court’s denial as missed
opportunity that left schools without clear guidance).
213. See B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 186 (3d
Cir. 2020) (setting the precedent “that Tinker does not apply to off-campus
speech”).
214. See id. at 192–94 (finding that B.L. did not waive free speech rights by
signing school and team rules).  For a discussion of the school policies B.L. agreed
to, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
215. See Anderson, supra note 3 (emphasizing prevalence of cyberbullying
amongst teens); see also Barack, supra note 8 (noting that in the COVID-19 era, it is
“impractical” for parents and schools to reduce cyberbullying by encouraging stu-
dents to take time away from their devices).
216. See Ludmila Battista, Cyberbullying: What is it and How to Prevent it?, PUR-
DUE GLOBAL (May 24, 2012), https://www.purdueglobal.edu/blog/psychology/
what-is-cyberbullying-how-to-prevent/ [https://perma.cc/MJ7G-B6NL].
217. See id. (noting that “[a] lot of kids may not even consider cyberbullying
as bullying until they fully understand how it can affect the other person”).  Ste-
phen Balkam, Chief Executive Officer of the Family Online Safety Institute in
Washington, D.C., suggests that schools recognize that internet is a significant part
of students’ lives and teach them how to use it appropriately. See Adams, supra
note 156 (urging educators to teach students how to properly use technology).  He
urged that “[t]eachers should not limit the discussion to computer class or In-
ternet safety day [and that they] should bring it up in any capacity, in any instance,
in any classroom.” Id.
218. See Battista, supra note 216 (“There are steps that schools can take to
address the issue of cyberbullying, and first and foremost is to promote a culture of
mutual respect and a tolerance or appreciation for diversity.”).
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ing, but they can at least reduce the number of occurrences.219  Absent
intervention, these proactive measures are the most effective way for
schools to protect students from the dangers of social media misuse.220
219. See id. (“Educating children about the possible negative effects of posting
personal information online and providing training about how to remove personal
information that shouldn’t be online can alleviate opportunities for cyberbullying
attacks.”); see also id. (explaining that “[t]aking the time to teach cyber ethics, in-
volving school counselors when necessary, and addressing and resolving reports of
cyberbullying quickly and immediately can make it less likely for repeated inci-
dents.” (citing Grace Shangkuan Koo, Bullying Can Ruin Children’s Lives, PHILIPPINE
DAILY INQUIRER (Aug. 21, 2011), https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/45425/bullying-
can-ruin-children%E2%80%99s-lives [https://perma.cc/FES4-HHMZ])).
220. See Adams, supra note 156 (noting that educators can be a “powerful
force in promoting a climate of respect”); see also Battista, supra note 216 (conclud-
ing that parents and schools must partner to combat cyberbullying incidents).
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